March, 1929

RECENT CASES
ACTIONS-FORMER RECOVERY AS BAR TO SECOND SuiT-The plaintiff in 1926
brought an action for the breach of the defendant's agreement to build a bungalow for the plaintiff in a good and workmanlike manner, specifying in his claim
the particular defects. He recovered. In 1927, the plaintiff brought the present
action, claiming damages for failure to complete the same bungalow in a good
and workmanlike manner, adding the words "and with proper materials" and
specifying defects different from those in the first action. Held, that no recovery would be allowed as this cause of action was the same as that in the first
suit. Conquer v. Boot, [1928] 2 K. B. 336.
When a demand or right of action is in its nature entire and indivisible, it
cannot be split up into several causes of action and made the basis of as many
separate suits, and a recovery for one part will bar a subsequent action for the
whole, the residue or any other part' As a general rule, but one cause of
action arises from the breach of a contract and all claims arising under the contract and then due constitute an entire and indivisible cause of action, a judgment thereon being a bar to any further action founded on such claims.2 However, several claims may arise out of the same contract or transaction upon
which separate actions may be brought as each liability accrues,' as in a contract
to do several things at different times.4 The application of the rule against
splitting causes of action involves a consideration of what constitutes a single
cause of action or entire demand. The difficulty in discriminating between
demands which are single and entire and those which are several has led to some
conflict in the application of the rule in particular cases.' The court, in the

'Baird v. U. S., 96 U. S. 430 (1877) ; Goodrich v. Yale, 97 Mass. 15 (1867) ;
Bendernagle v. Cocks, i9 Wend. 207 (N. Y. 1838) ; Fell v. Bennett, IO Pa. 181,
5 Atl. 17 (1885); see 2 BLACK, LAW OF JUDGMENTS (2d ed. 19o2) § 734 and
cases cited.

The reasons for the rule are admirably stated by BOWER, THE DOC-

176: There are three theories whereon the doctrine of former recovery is commonly justified. (I) The general interest of the
community in the termination of disputes and in the finality and conclusiveness
of judicial decisions. (2) The right of the individual to be protected from vexatious multiplication of suits at the instance of an opponent whose superior
wealth and resources may, unless curbed by this doctrine, weigh down judicially
declared right and innocence. (3) Any cause of action which results in a judgment is in contemplation of the law merged in the judgment.
'Watts v. Weston, 238 Fed. 149 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916) ; Rosenmuller v. Lampe,
89 Ill. 212 (1878); Osborne v. Atkins, 72 Mass. 423 (1856); Silberstein v.
TRINE OF REs JUDICATA (1924)

Begun, 232 N. Y. 319, 133 N. E. 904 (1922); Anhaltzer v. Benedum. 266 Pa.
113, 1O9 Atl. 597 (I919) ; Florence v. Jenings, 2 C. B. (N. s.) 454 (Eng. 1857).

'Shanklin v. Gray, III Cal. 88, 43 Pac. 399 (1896); Brown v. Chadwick,
Mo. App. 6x5 (1888); Johnson v. Meeker, 96 N. Y. 93 (1884); Wolf v.
Welton, 30 Pa. 202 (1858).
32

Hanham v. Sherman, 114 Mass. 19 (1873) ; Parmenter v. State, 135 N. Y.
154, 31 N. E. 1035 (1892) ; Howe v. Harding, 84 Tex. 74, 19 S. XV. 363 (1892).
'Dulaney v. Payne, 101 Ill. 325 (1882) ; Perry v. Dickerson, 85 N. Y. 345

(188i) ; Hill v. Joy, 149 Pa.

243, 24

Atl. 293 (1892) ; Brunsden v. Humphrey,

14 Q. B. D. 141 (Eng. 1884).

(688)
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principal case, adopts the most popular of the various tests used to determine if
a second suit is on the same cause of action as the first: Would the same evidence support both suits?' It would seem that under any of the tests, the same
result would be reached in the principal case. There was only one contract to
build the bungalow and one consideration to be paid. If the promises to build
in a good and workmanlike manner and with proper materials were express,
they were clearly not promises to do several things at different times, but were
rather promises which applied to everything done under the contract and continued during the life of the whole contract. If they were implied, they were
an integral part of the contract to build because they directly affected it throughout the term of the contract.' The fact that the items of damage specified are
different cannot affect the basic character of these promises. The case has been
properly called illustrative of the danger of premature legal proceedings!

AGENcY-LABILITY OF PRINCIPAL FOR MISREPRESENTATION OF AGENT-An

agent of the defendant railroad was employed to give notice to those engaged in
the cotton trade of the arrival of cotton under "order notify" bills of lading.
The agent, for his own enrichment, forged and negotiated such a bill, which was
presented to the plaintiff for payment. In response to the plaintiff's inquiry,
the agent informed him that the cotton described in the bill had been received.'
Thereupon the plaintiff paid the bill. No cotton had ever been sent and the
plaintiff brings an action in deceit against the principal for the agent's false
statement. Held, that the statement was made within the scope of the agent's
employment and the principal is liable. Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line Railway
Company, 49 Sup. Ct. 161 (1929).
For many years this branch of the law of principal and agent had been in a
most unsettled state. The English courts, after first adopting the rule that the
principal is not liable, if the agent acts for his own benefit,' have finally reached
the conclusion that so long as the act complained of is within the scope of the
agent's employment the principal is liable
The American courts, with the
"The Haytian Republic, 154 U. S. 118, 14 Sup. Ct. 992 (1894); Water Co.
v. Hutchinson, 16o Fed. 41 (C. C. A. 8th, io8) ; Hodge v. Shaw, 85 Iowa 137,
52 N. W. 8 (1892) ; Rossman v. Tilleney, 8o Minn. i6o, 83 N. IV. 42 (igoo) ;
Steinbach v. Relief Fire Ins. Co., 77 N. Y. 498 (1879) ; Roney v. Vestlake, 216
Pa. 374, 65 Atl. 8o7/ (1907) ; Brunsden v. Humphrey, supra note 5. Other tests
which have been used are: (i) Does the entire claim arise from the same act
or contract, or from distinct and different acts or contracts? Sprinkle v. Fleming, 2o9 Mo. App. 405, 239 S. W. 899 (1922) ; Secor v. Sturgis, 16 N. Y..548
(1858).
(2) Does the investigation involve separate and independent inquiries
and findings by the jury? Boyce v. Christy, 47 Mo. 7o (187o).
(3) Is the
consideration exclusive or is it apportioned to various items? Lucesco Oil Co.
v. Brewer, 66 Pa. 351 (1870) ; Bigg v. Whisking, 14 C. B. 195 (1853).
Hill v. Joy, supra note 5.
8 (1928)
72 Sol. J. 312.
1

Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank, L. R. 2 Ex. 258 (1867); British
Mutual Banking Co. v. Charnwood Forest Ry., 18 Q. B. D. 714 (1887) ; Mackay
v. Commercial Bank of New Brunswick, L. R. 5 App. Cas. 394 (1874).
'Lloyd v. Grace, [1912] App. Cas. 716.
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English cases as authority, seem to be divided, a number of them limiting the
3
doctrine of respondent superior to cases where the principal is benefited, while
others' are in accord with the English rule. In a former federal case,' it was
logically decided that a railroad could not be held liable on a contract basis,
where an agent who had authority to issue bills of lading issued a bill without
having received any goods for it, for in so doing the agent was not acting
within the scope of his authority. To this extent the case has often been cited
and followed.' Nevertheless, in a New York case,7 under a similar set of facts,
the principal was held liable on the ground that whether or not any goods had
been received for the bill of lading was a fact within the "peculiar knowledge"
of the agent, since the third party had no means of finding out the truth of the
agent's representation. The real reason for this decision seems to be one of
economic practicability favoring the negotiability of bills of lading. This end
has been attained in the federal courts by a statute,' which provides that the
carrier shall be liable on a bill so issued even though the merchandise is not
received by the agent. In other words, the statute makes the principal liable in
contract even if the agent acted outside the scope of his authority. The principal
case, holding the principal in tort for an act of the agent done solely for the
agent's own benefit, without invoking the "peculiar knowledge" doctrine, is
important in that it definitely represents an acceptance by the Supreme Court of
the broader English rule."

BILLS AND NOTES-BANK CREDITING DEPOSITOR'S ACCOUNT AS HOLDER FOR
VALuE-The Colorado National Bank made two loans to the Western Milling

Co. on the latter's promissory notes, with drafts of like amount on the Western
Grain Co. attached, as collateral security. The bank claims to be a purchaser
for value of the drafts by reason of the fact that it credited the Milling Co.
3
Friedlander v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 130 U. S. 416, 9 Sup. Ct. 570
(1889); Harris,'Irby & Vose v. Allied Compress Co., 6 F. (2d) 7 (C. C. A.
5th, 1925) ; Haskell v. Starbird, 152 Mass. ii, i42 N. E. 695 (1890).
'Planters Rice Mills Co. v. Merchants' Nat. Bk., 78 Ga. 574, 3 S. E. 327
(887); McCord v. Western Union Tel. Co., 39 Minn. X8i, 39 N. W. 315
(I888) ; Havens v. Bk. of Tarboro, 132 N. C. 214, 43 S. E. 639 (1903) ; Daugherty v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 7 Nev. 368 (1872).
'Friedlander v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., supra note 3.
6
Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Nat. Park Bk., i88 Ala. iog, 65 So.
ioo3 (1919); Roy & Roy v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 42 Wash. 572, 85 Pac.

53 (i9o6).
7
Bank of Batavia v. New York, Lake Erie & Western R. R., io6 N. Y.
195, 12 N. E. 433 (1887).
'Fletcher v. Great West. Elev. Co., 12 S. D. 643, 82 N. W. 184 (900);
Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Hutchings, 78 Kan. 758, 99 Pac. 230 (908).
See
Cf. Sears
Dulaney v. Phila. & Read. Ry. Co., 228 Pa. i8o, 77 Ati. 507 (910).
v. Vingate, 3 Allen io3 (Mass. 1861), and Thomas v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R.
Co., 85 S. C. 537, 67 S. E. 9o8 (igio).

'FEDERAL
§ io2 0(1926).

BILLS OF LADING ACT,

39

STAT. 542, § 22 (I916),

49 U. S. C.

" Friedlander v. Texas and Pacific Ry. Co., supra note 3, is expressly overruled by the court in so far as it limits the liability of the principal to acts of
the agent done for the principal's benefit. 49 Sup. Ct. at 163.
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with the amount of the instruments on the latter's general checking account.
The Milling Co. had maintained since such crediting a minimum balance with
the bank in excess of the total of the two drafts. Held, that the bank was not
a purchaser for value. Colorado Nat. Bank v. Western Grain Co., 1i8 So. 588
(Ala. 1928).
A bank by discounting negotiable paper for a depositor and giving him
credit thereon does not become a holder for value
More than a mere bookkeeping credit is required to place the bank on this superior footing.' Succinctly stated, the rule is that the actual withdrawal of the credit established
must take place
Thus far, and thus far only, the courts of this country are
in agreement. The difficulty arises in determining when the credit has been
withdrawn. The principal case would seem to require that the depositor's total
account be reduced, since the discount of the drafts, to a sum less than the
amount of the drafts. This is decidedly a minority view.' Most courts would
not require a decrease in the depositor's account to this point, but only a withdrawal of the amount of the particular credit in question
In determining
whether such a withdrawal has taken place "the first in first out rule". is used.
The procedure is to charge withdrawals against the oldest item of credit.7 If,
then, withdrawals exceed the balance on hand at the time the drafts were discounted, such excess is charged against the drafts and the bank is held to become
a holder for value pro tanto8 Subsequent deposits are totally ignored in the
Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Marden Co., 234 Mass. 161, 125 N. E. 384
(1919) ; Farmers' and Merchants' Bank v. Quasebarth, 104 Karn. 422, 179 Pac.
300 (1919) ; First Nat. Bank v. Denfield, 143 Minn. 281, 173 N. W. 66I (1919) ;
Bank of Gulfport v. Smith, 132 Miss. 63, 95 So. 785 (1923) ; Fruitticher Elec.
Co. v. Birmingham Trust and Savings Co., 2O Ala. 676, 79 So. 248 (igis) ;
Varney v. Natl. City Bank, 3o Ind. App. 598, 139 N. E. 326 (1923).
This being
the rule where the credit is absolute, its application, where a merely conditional
credit is given, is even clearer. Worth Co. v. International Sugar Co., 172 N. C.
335, 90 S. E. 295 (1916) ; Manufacturer's Finance Co. v. Amazon Cotton Mills
Co., 187 N. C. 223, 121 S. E. 439 (1924). There is of course a distinction between the bank as a purchaser, and as a purchaser for value. See Albert S.
Bolles, When Is a Bank the Bona Fide Owner of a Check Left for Deposit or
Collection (1924) 56 U. OF PA. L. REv. 375, 379.
'Bland v. Fidelity Trust Co., 71 Fla. 499, 7, So. 63o (1915) ; First State
Bank & Trust Co. v. First Natl. Bank, 314 Ill. :69, 145 N. E. 382 (1924);
Anthon State Bank v. Bernard, 198 Iowa 1345, 2Ol N. W. 59 (1923) ; Minatare
Bank v. Wilson, 112 Neb. 216, 199 N. W. 111 (924).
'Bank v. Clayton, 2o6 Ala. 518, 9o So. 899 (I921) ; Bath Natl. Bank v.
Sonnenstrahl, Inc., 249 N. Y. 391 (1928) ; I DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
(6th ed. 1913) 907.
' Sherrill v. Merchants' and Mechanics' Trust & Savings Bank, 195 Ala.
175, 70 So. 723 (1915); Citizens' Natl. Bank v. Buchert, 14 Ala. App. 511,
71 So. 82 (1916) ; Nat]. Bank of Commerce v. Morgan, 2o7 Ala. 65, 92 So. 10
(1921), 24 A. L. R. 897 (I923).
5
Ashley & Rumelin v. Brady, 41 Idaho I6O, 238 Pac. 314 (1925) ; (1921)
69 U. OF PA. L. REV. 378.
'Fox v. Bank of Kansas City, 3o Kan. 44, i Pac. 789 (1883) ; First Nat.
Bank v. McNary, 122 Minn. 215, 142 N. W. 139 (1913).
'Howells State Bank v. Hekrdale, 113 Neb. 561, 2o3 N. W. 1OO5 (1925).
'Standard Bank of Canada v. Allegheny Lumber Co., 77 Pa. Super. 222
(1921) ; Natl. Bank v. Gibson, 1O5 Wash. 578, 179 Pac. 117 (1919) ; Bank of
Gulfport v. Smith, 132 Miss. 63, 95 So. 785 (1923).
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calculation. The bank is held to be a holder for value, according to the majority view, although the depositor, by reason of subsequent deposits, has at all
times had on hand a balance greatly in excess of the amount of the paper. The
conflict of opinion is not surprising, inasmuch as either rule can be supported.
It seems unfair to put the bank in the superior position of a holder for value.
so as to be protected from defenses, when it has funds of the depositor in excess
of the amount of the instrument under its control at the time it receives notice
thereof. However, the majority rule has the distinct advantage of furthering
the general acceptability of the instruments, at least to banks and other financial
institutions. The problem does not arise in England since it is there held, by a
rather strict adherence to the rules of the law merchant, that merely crediting
the depositor's account constitutes the bank a holder for value." Logically, the
English view seems correct. If the bank on receiving the draft handed the
money over to the depositor, it would unquestionably be a holder for value.
And, if the depositor then handed the bills back to the bank and received credit
on his pass book as on an ordinary cash deposit, the bank's position with regard
to the note would be unaffected. The customary short-cut method of crediting
the depositor's account, if analyzed, is merely a combination of the two steps
outlined above, and, therefore, should properly be deemed value per se irrespective of any subsequent withdrawals by the depositor.
BRI GEs-ExPIRATox OF TOLL FRANcHisES-REOVAL OF TOLLs-The
defendant was the assignee of a franchise' granting the right to build and maintain a toll bridge for twenty years, and had purchased the land supporting the
abutments of the bridge. On the expiration of the franchise, the plaintiff applied for an injunction to restrain further obstruction of the bridge by the
defendant for the purpose of collecting tolls. Held, that the bridge was a public
way free of any right in the defendant to exact toll. Grove Bridge Co. et al. v.
State ex rel. Hampton, County Attorney, 271 Pac. 846 (Okla. 1928).
A bridge is generally considered part of a highway or road," and hence the

City Deposit Bank v. Green, I3O Iowa 384, io6 N. W. 942 (I9O6) ; Fredonia Nat. Bank v. Tomner, 131 Mich. 674, 92 N. W. 348 (19o2) ; West Minn.
First Nat. Bank v. Persall, IIo Minn. 333, 125 N. W. 5o6 (i9io).
' Ex parte Richdale, I9 Ch. Div. 409 (Eng. 1881) ; Royal Bank v. Tottenham, [1894] 2 Q. B. 715; Bank of British N. A. v. Warren, i Ont. L. Rep.
257 (i99). In two or three isolated cases in the United States, the courts seem
to have based their decisions upon the English and Canadian doctrine. In
Wheeler v. First Nat. Bank, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 192 (1886), the court, citing the
Richdale case, supra, stated: "When the bank placed the purchase price of the
notes to the credit of . . . it thereby parted with value. Furthermore, the
bank thereby altered its position to its detriment by assuming the responsibility
of making demand of payment of the makers and giving notice of non-payment
to the indorsers."
'The franchise had been granted to the assignor of the defendant by the
District Court for the Northern District in Indian Territory, under a power

derived from the Act of Congress, Februay i8,

1901, 31 STAT.

749.

2 Sandpoint v. Doyle, 14 Idaho 749, 95 Pac. 945 (i9o8); Willis v. Winona,

59 Minn. 27, 6o N. W. 814 (1894) ; Penn Township v. Perry County, 78 Pa. 457
(1875) ; see Montgomery County v. Clarksville Turnpike Co., 12o Tenn. 76, 81,
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principles of law applicable to turnpikes' would apply equally well to toll
bridges. The private right to maintain a turnpike or toll bridge is derived only
from the state. The difference between a turnpike and a public highway is that
the latter is built and maintained by taxes, the former at the expense of private
corporations or individuals, who are reimbursed by the exercise of their privilege to exact tolls
The acceptance of the franchise and the opening of the way
to the .public thereunder are deemed to operate as a dedication of the turnpike
or toll bridge to the public, subject only to the right of the holder of the franchise to charge toll for the use of the way by the public So, upon the expiration of the franchise, or the corporate existence of the holder thereof, the right
to exact toll lapses, and the way becomes free to the public without any further
compensation to the holder of the franchise It would seem, then, that the
10 S. W. 1152, 1153 (i907). But in determining the liability of governmental
bodies for the construction and maintenance of roads, bridges are distinguished
from roads because of the greater expense involved. See Commissioners of
Drainage District v. Commissioners of Highways, 87 Ill. App. 93, 101 (I899) ;
St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. R. v. People, 200 Ill. 365, 367, 65 N. E. 715, 716 (x9o6) ;
Flemingsburg v. Fleming County, 127 Ky. i2o, 126, 105 S. W. 133, 135 (1907).

3
"A turnpike is a road constructed and maintained by a private corporation
or by individuals under authority of law, with the right to gather toll from
those who travel upon it." I ELIuorr, ROADS AND! STrrs (4th ed. 1926) § 79.
They are covered by a broad classification of public highways. Patapsco Co. v.
Baltimore, iIO Md. 306, 72 Ad. IO39 (i909) ; Weirich v. State, 140 Wis. 98, 121
N. W. 652 (9O9).
But cf. Bradshaw v. Rodgers, 20 Johns. io2 (N. Y. 1822).
'Covington Road Co. v. Sandford, x64 U. S. 578, 17 Sup. Ct. 198 (1896) ;
Slayton v. Crittendon County, 284 Fed. 858 (E. D. Ark. 1922) ; Pineville v.
Pineville Bridge Co., 179 Ky. 375, 200 S. W. 659 (1918) ; Peru Turnpike Co. v.
Peru, 9I Vt. 295, ioo Atl. 679 (917).
England seems to have recognized that
the right might be acquired by prescription. Mayor of Yarmouth v. Eaton, 3
Burr. 1402 (763); Pelhan v. Pickersgill, i Term Rep. 66o (1787). But even
in the early American decisions such a rule seems very doubtful. See Fales v.
Whiting, 7 Pick. 225, 232 (Mass. 1828); Panton Turnpike Co. v. Bishop, Ii Vt.

198, 202 (1839).

'State v. Lawrence Bridge Co.,

22

Kan. 438 (1879); Commonwealth v.

Wilkinion, I6 Pick. 175 (Mass. 1824) ; State v. Gravel Road Co., 138 Mo. 332,

39 S. W. 910 (1896) ; Montgomery County v. Clarksville Turnpike Co., supra
note 2; see Carter v. Ridge Turnpike Co., 22 Pa. Super. 162, i7o (903), aff'd,
208 Pa. 565, 57 Ad. 988 (1904).
'Sears v. Tuolome County, 132 Cal. 167, 64 Pac. 270 (I9O1) ; Gardilla v.
Amador County, 164 Cal. 555, 129 Pac. 993 (913) ; Virginia Canon Toll Road

Co. v. People, 22 Colo. 429, 45 Pac. 398 (1896) ; Craig v. People, 47 Ill. 487
(1868) ; State v. Gravel Road Co., supra note 5; State v. Lake, 8 Nev. 276
(1873) ; Scheper v. Clark, 124 S. C. 3o2, H7 S. E. 599 (1922) ; see Pittsburgh,
etc., R. R. v. Commonwealth, IO4 Pa. 583, 586 (1883) ; Pittsburgh, etc., R. R.
v. Commonwealth, 165 Pa. 37, 41, 3o Atl. 5I1, 512 (1894); New Street Bridge
Co. v. Public Service Commission, 76 Pa. Super. 6, 9 (1921).
IScott County Road Co. v. Missouri, 215 U. S. 336, 3o Sup. Ct. iio (I9O9):
State v. Lawrence Bridge Co., supra note 5; Rockwith v. State Road Bridge
Co., 145 Mich. 455, io8 N. W. 785 (I9O6) ; State v. Cape Girardeau & J. Gravel
Road Co., 207 Mo. 85, 105 S. W. 761 (19o7) ; State v. Dayton Toll Road Co.,
io Nev. I55 (1875); Montgomery County v. Clarksville Turnpike Co., supra
note 2. And under a statute to that effect. People v. Davidson, 79 Cal. 166,
21 Pac. 538 (889) ; Sears v. Tuolome County; Gardella v. Amador County,
both supra note 6. But when the holder of the expired franchise owns a fee in
the land, it has been held that the public does not acquire the right to free pas-
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decision in the instant case is well-founded in logic. Furthermore, in legal proceedings to free a bridge or road from toll before the franchise has expired, it
would follow that the holder of the franchise is entitled to compensation only
for the value of the remaining period of his franchise, the land and the physical
property or material in the way having been dedicated to the public in return
for his right to collect tolls.' But many jurisdictions in such proceedings grant
damages for the value of the land and the physical property as well as that of
the franchise.' The granting of damages for the land and the physical property
should be confined to those cases in which the franchise granted a perpetual right
of collection, for then the value of the franchise is indeterminable other than in
terms of an absolute and free title in the physical property.

COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES-RIGHT TO

DIsMIss

STUDENT WITHOUT STAT-

CAusE-Plaintiff registered at defendant university in a four year course
leading to a degree. In matriculating, plaintiff signed a registration card which
contained this provision: "In order to safeguard its scholarship and its moral
atmosphere, the University reserves the right to request the withdrawal of any
student whose presence is deemed detrimental. Specific charges may or may not
accompany a request for withdrawal." In her senior year, plaintiff was dismissed, the authorities refusing to state any reason. Plaintiff sued for reinstatement. Held, that such dismissal was within defendant's rights. Anthony v.
Syracuse University. 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N. Y. Supp. 435 (1928) -*
It is uniformly held in the United States that the relation between a college
ING

sage over the road. People v. Newburgh Road Co., 86 N. Y. I (1881). But
the better view seems to be that the same rule applies even when the holder of
the franchise owns the fee in the land. State v. Lake, supra note 6.
On abandonment of a franchise for a toll road by its holder, who held the
land in fee, it has been held that the land reverts to the former owners thereof.
Hooker v. Utica Turnpike Road Co., 12 Wend. 371 (N. Y. 1834). But again
the better rule seems to be that the road retains its public nature as a highway.
State v. Western North Carolina R. R., 95 N. C. 6o2 (1886).
' Central Bridge Corp. v. Lowell, 15 Gray io6 (Mass. 186o); Sunderland
Bridge Case, 122 Mass. 459 (1877); see State v. Canterbury, 28 N. H. 195,
225 (1854) ; Taylor v. Rutland, 26 Vt. 313, 314 (1854) ; cf. Little Nestucca Road
Co. v. Tillamook County, 31 Ore. I, 48 Pac. 465 (1865).
'Chaplin Turnpike Co. v. Nelson County, 77 S. W. 377 (Ky. 1903) ; see
Maysville Turnpike Co. v. Wiggins, 1O4 Ky. 540, 545, 47 S. W. 434, 435 (1898).
Pennsylvania under statutes for freeing roads of toll employs this measure of
damages.

Montgomery County v. Bridge Co., iO Pa. 54, 2o Atl. 407 (1885) ;

Mifflin Bridge Co. v. County of Juniata, 144 Pa. 365, 22 Atl. 896 (1891) ; Clarion
Turnpike & Bridge Co. v. Clarion County, 172 Pa. 243, 33 At. 58o (1896);
Harrisburg, C. & C. Turnpike Co. v. Cumberland County, 225 Pa. 467, 74 Atl.
340 (19o9) ; Chestnut Hill Turnpike Co. v. Montgomery County,

228

Pa. I, 76

Atl. 726 (191o). The decisions under the statutes do not seem consistent with
the view that a toll bridge or turnpike is public highway subject only to the right
of the holder of the franchise to exact toll for the public use. Derry Township
Road, 30 Pa. Super. 538 (19o6) ; Scranton v. Laurel Run Turnpike Co., 225 Pa..
82, 73 Atl. 1O63 (19o9) ; and the Pennsylvania cases supra note 6.
1

Rev'g 130 Misc.

249, 223

N. Y. Supp. 796

(1927).
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and its students is a contractual one! England, however, perhaps because of the
longer tradition and unique independence of her universities, recognizes no such
contractual relationship, and courts there will afford no redress to a student arbitrarily dismissed or otherwise disciplined
The American contractual theory
gives colleges less absolute power, but in practice courts interfere only where
there has been a palpable abuse of the wide discretion possessed by the authorities.4 Unless the right has been specifically reserved, however, a university may
not dismiss arbitrarily, and mandamus will issue to enforce its contractual
obligation. But, if after hearing and careful examination, it appears that a
student's continued presence would be clearly injurious, he may always be dismissed! Where, at matriculation, the institution specifically reserves the right
to dismiss without cause, it is submitted that no contract exists because of the
lack of mutuality, the university being bound only so long as it pleases t The
lower court in the instant case interpreted defendant's rule as a reservation of
'Stetson University v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 5io, io2 So. 637 (1924); Baltimore

University v. Colton, 98 Md. 623, 57 Atl. 14 (1904); People ex rel. Cecil v.
Bellevue Medical College, 6o Hun bo7, 14 N. Y. Supp. 49o (1891), aff'd, 128

N. Y. 621, 28 N. E. 253 (189I) ; Barker v. Trustees of Bryn Mawr College, 278
Pa. 121, 122 Atl. 22o (1923). The offer is made up collectively of the terms of
the university catalogue, bulletins issued, and notices printed on registration
cards.. All the acts of registration constitute the acceptance.
'Green v. Master and Fellows of St. Peter's College, Cambridge, 31 L. J.
119 (1896); Thomson v. University of London, 33 L. J. Rp. Ch. 625 (1864)

semble.
"North v. University of Illinois, 137 Ill. 296, 27 N. E. 54 (i89i) ; Fertich v.
Michener, iii Ind. 472 (1877); Dunn's Case, 9 Pa. Co. Rep. 417 (189i). The
right to make regulations for the conduct of students is based upon the fact that
the university stands in loco parentis to them, particularly in the case of infant
students. Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S. W. 204 (1913) ; People
ex rel. Pratt v. Wheaton College, 40 Ill. 186 (1866). A state-aided university
may not make the giving up of fraternity affiliations a condition precedent to
admission, but after matriculation it may forbid such membership as an incident
to its regulation of the conduct of its students. State ex reL. Stallard v. White,
82 Ind. 278 (1882). However, where the legislature has abolished fraternities, a
pledge to give up such affiliations may be required before admission. University
of Mississippi v. Waugh, iO5 Miss. 623, 62 So. 827 (1913).
'Baltimore University v. Colton, supra note 2; Goldstein v. New York University, 76 App. Div. 8o, 78 N. Y. Supp. 739 (i9o2) ; State ex rel. Nelson v.
Lincoln Medical College, 81 Neb. 533, 116 N. W. 294 (19o8); Tate v. North
Pacific College, 70 Ore. i6o, 140 Pac. 743 (1914). These cases represent an
exception to the general rule that mandamus will not issue to compel private
corporations to fulfill their contractual obligations to individuals. The general
rule was applied and mandamus refused in Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical
College, 156 Mich. 95, 12o N. W. 589 (igog); Burg v. Milwaukee Medical
College, 128 Wis. 7, io6 N. W. 116 (i9o6).

' Goldstein v. New York University, supra note 5; Koblitz v. Western

Reserve University,

21

Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. I44 (191o).

The student must

demand a hearing and be refused before he may apply for judicial relief.
Dunn's Case, supra note 4.
'I WILLISTON, CONTRACrs (1924) § 104. Under such circumstances, an

institution which does not receive state aid may dismiss, summarily without trial
or announcement of reason. Stetson University v. Hunt; Barker v. Trustees of
Bryn Mawr College, both supra note 2. In the latter case, the college catalogue
announced that the "college reserves the right to exclude at any time students
whose conduct or academic standing it regards as undesirable."
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such right, but achieved a different result by declaring the provision making for
such lack of mutuality to be contrary to public policy and therefore void, leaving
a binding contract, specific performance of which it granted plaintiff.8 However,
the upper court interpreted the provision as permitting dismissal for only two
causes, i. e., conduct violative either of the university's scholarship ideals or of
its moral atmosphere.' Thus there was mutuality and a binding contract, breach
of which by the university could be shown by plaintiff only by proving that dismissal was not for one of the two reasons allowable. The university need not
state which cause induced its action. The decision exemplifies the reluctance of
the courts to interfere with college regulations and the tendency to regard contracts with students as obligations sui generis.

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAw-GUARANTY

OF REMEDIES-VALIDITY

OF

STATUTE

DENYING TO GUEST IN AUTOMOBILE RIGHT OF RECOVERY AGAINST OWNER OR
DiRuiv FOR PERSONAL INJURIEs-An Oregon statute provided that a person who

accepts a ride as guest in an automobile should have no right of recovery against
the driver or owner of the automobile for any personal injuries sustained while
riding as guest.

The State Constitution' provides that ".

. . every man shall

have remedy by due course of law for injury done him in his person, property
or reputation." Plaintiff sues for injuries sustained while riding as guest in
defendants' auto. Held, that the statute is unconstitutional, and is no bar to
plaintiff's action. Stewart s. Houk, 271 Pac. 998 (Ore. z928).
One of the greatest liberties conferred by Magna Charta is the guaranty
that "We will sell to no man, we will not deny to any man either justice or
right." 2 This provision is often found in the bills of right in state constitutions.
Few cases have arisen under such clauses, and most of those which have come
up are contract cases, involving not only the guaranty of remedy clause but also
the obligation of contract clause of the federal Constitution In these cases the
state's control over remedies and procedure is upheld if such control does not
impair the obligation of contract, and provides an adequate remedy.' If a statute
bars a remedy altogether,5 or so hinders it as to render it useless, it is uncon8
Supra note I, at 256, 258, 223 N. Y. Supp. at 8o5, 807. The argument of
public policy gains support from the fact that an unexplained dismissal is often
the basis of unfounded rumors and is thus destructive of reputation. Yet such
an absolute power of dismissal without statement of the reason was upheld in
Barker v. Trustees of Bryn Mawr College, supra note 7.
9
Supra, at 491, 231 N. Y. Supp. at 44o. Cf. provision in the Bryn Mawr
College catalogue and its interpretation, supra note 7.
1OREGON, CONSTITUTION,
'MAGNA
'U.

S.

CHARTA,

Art. I, § IO.

§ 40.

CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, § io.

'Wilson v. Simon, 91 Md. I, 45 Atl. 1022 (i9OO) ; Reining v. City of Buffal, io2 N. Y. 308, 6 N. E. 729 (1896) ; Kirkman v. Bird, 22 Utah ioo. 61 Pac.
338 (I9OO); cf. McClain v. Williams, IO S. D. 332, 73 N. W.
5

72

Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, 187 U. S. 437,
(1902); Penrose v. Erie Canal Co., 56 Pa. 46 (1867).

(1897).
23

Sup. Ct. 234
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stitutional.1 In the few cases where a statute attempted to deny a right of action
to enforce a recognized common law right, the courts have held such statutes
invalid.7 In Opinion of the Justices' a proposed law would have exempted the
members of labor unions from liability for tortious acts committed on behalf of
the union. The court, in an advisory opinion, held that such a law would be
unconstitutional under a provision like the one in the principal case, and also
because it would deny equal protection of law, as guaranteed by the due process
clause. Assuming, as the court does in the principal case, that a guest in an
automobile can assert a right of action against the driver or owner for injuries
caused by the negligence of the driver,' the decision in the principal case seems
correct. The statute clearly violates the guaranty of remedy provision, and it
certainly seems to deprive a guest of equal protection of the laws.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-TAKING PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR PRIVATE UsE-A
Washington statute' authorized the condemnation of private property for private
purposes at a compensation, provided such a taking was necessary to the proper
use and enjoyment of one's property, the transaction to be governed by the ordinary proceedings relating to the exercise of the power of eminent domain. The
plaintiff, a lumber corporation, endeavored to obtain a private logging road
across the defendant's property, by invoking the above statute. The defendant
pleaded that the Washington statute was unconstitutional as violating the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Held, that the
statute is constitutional. Ruddock v. Bloedal Lumber Co., 28 F. (2d) 684
(C. C. A. 9th, 1928).
While the above statute has several times been held valid by the courts of
2
the state of Washington, it is a fundamental principle of constitutional law that
the federal courts are not bound by the decisions of state courts, when federal
questions are involved.' Consequently, the court in the present case was obliged

" Hendrickson v. Apperson, 245 U. S. 105, 38 Sup. Ct. 4 4 (1917) ; Webster v.
City of Beaver Dam, 84 Fed. 28o (C. C. E. D. Wis. 1898); Summerville v.
Kelliher, 144 Cal. 155, 77 Pac. 889 (19o4); cf. Louisiana v. Mayor of New
Orleans, 109 U. S. 285, 3 Sup. Ct. 211 (1883).
7 Mattson v. Astoria, 39 Ore. 577, 65 Pac. io66 (i9oi) ; Rhines v. Clark, 51
Pa. 96 (1865) ; Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 211 Mass. 618, 98 N. E.
337 (1912) ; cf. Hanson v. Krehbiel, 68 Kans. 670, 75 Pac. 104 (19o4) ; Neafie
v. Hoboken Printing Co., 75 N. J. L. 564, 68 Atl. 146 (19o7) ; contra: Comer v.
Age Herald Publishing Co., 151 Ala. 613, 44 So. 673 (1907). In Kintz v.
Harrigen, 99 Ohio St. 240, 124 N. E. 468 (1919) it was held that such a provision authorized a right of action, which was denied at common law.
'Supra note 7.
' As to the liability of an auto driver to his guest see Note (1925) 75 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 78.
tWASir. ComP. STAT.

(Remington, 1922) § 6746.

'State ex rel. Mountain Timber Co. v. Superior Court, 77 Wash.
Pac. 994 (1914) ; State e.x rel. Woodruff v. Superior Court, 145 Wash.
Pac. 379 (1927).
'Yeseer v. Washington Commrs., 146 U. S. 646, 13 Sup. Ct. 19o
Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 17 Sup. Ct. 56
Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 26 Sup. Ct. 36 (19o5).

585, 137
129, 259

(1892);
(1896);
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to determine the validity of the statute in the light of the United States Constitution. It is well settled that, even if private property is taken at a compensation, if it is not taken for a public use, the proceedings violate the due process
clause and are void.' In determining what is a public use, the courts are in
great conflict, resulting from the fact that certain courts construe the words to
mean actual use by the public,5 while others hold that the proceedings are valid
whenever the public may derive any benefit or advantage from the exercise of
the power.' It is thus apparent that the legislature of a given state, if it follows
this latter view, has a wide discretion in what it may declare to be a public use;
and the same is true of the courts of any one state. This is particularly true in
view of the varying topographical and geographical conditions throughout the
country as a whole. Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court has been
most reluctant to reverse the decision of a state court in its construction as to
what constitutes a public use, especially when the legislature of the state has
announced a policy in conformity with the state decision.' The present case,
however, differs materially from such cases, in that neither the legislature nor
the courts of Washington upheld the condemnation as a taking for a public use,
but on the contrary expressly stipulated that the taking for a private use, when
necessary, was valid under the Washington Constitution.! There is obviously a
great difference in legal theory between the two situations. It is believed that,
though the decision of the court in substance may be just and reasonable under
the circumstances, it cannot be supported under the United States Constitution
and the interpretation thereof.9
DAMAGS-INcLUSION
OF Loss OF PROFITS IN PLAINTIFF'S BusrNEss-A
sub-contractor, while doing plastering on a building for the general contractor,
fell into an open elevator well. In suing the general contractor for his negligence, the plaintiff offered evidence to show that by reason of his inability to
work for several months, due to the injury, he incurred losses in completing several other contracts under which he was then obligated. His reason for these
losses was, that he could not give these contracts his personal supervision. The
lower court excluded this evidence on the ground that it would lead to a field of

ISecombe v. Milwaukee, 23 Wall. io8 (1874) ; Salisbury Land Co. v. Commonwealth, 215 Mass. 371, 102 N. E. 619 (1913) ; Missouri Pac. R. R. Co. v.
Nebraska, 164 U. S. 416 (1896).
'School v German Coal Co., 118 IIl. 427, I N. E. igg (1887) ; Minnesota
Canal Co. v. Koochiching Co., 97 Minn. 429, 107 N. W. 405 (19o6); Penna.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia, 242 Pa. 47, 88 Atl. 904 (1913).
'Board of Commrs. v. Manchester, 87 Conn. 193, 87 At. 87o (1913);

Tanner v. Treasury Mining Co., 35 Colo. 593, 83 Pac. 464 (igo6).

See note

(1914) 49 L. R. A. (N. s.) lO62.

'Hairston v. Danville, etc., Railway Co., 208 U. S. 598, 28 Sup. Ct. 331
(i9o8) ; Clark v. Nash, 198 U. S. 361, 25 Sup. Ct. 676 (9o5) ; Strickley v.
Highland Mining Co., 200 U. S. 527, 26 Sup. Ct. 3oi (i9o6).
' State ex rel. Grays Harbor Logging Co. v. Superior Court, 82 Wash. 503,
144 Pac. 722 (1914) ; cases cited supra note 2.
' See note (1927) 51 A. L. R. 1194, on the interesting analogous question of

whether or not the securing of a private road as an outlet for a lumber corporation is in fact a public purpose.
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speculative damages. Held, that it was error to exclude this evidence. Ball v.
Pardy Contr. Co., 143 At. 855 (Conn. 1928).
The general rule seems to be settled that if a personal injury results in a
loss of profits to the plaintiff's business, no recovery may be had for the loss of
such profits, but is limited to the value of the plaintiff's lost time.' In determining this, however, the loss of profits may be shown as evidence of the value
of the plaintiff's time or earning power, although not as an element of damage
If the profits are merely speculative or uncertain,' or result from the investment
of capital," then evidence of profits is not admissible, since such evidence is not
relevant to the plaintiff's personal earning power. The decision in the principal
case is illustrative of the distinction between the responsibility for a tort and
that for a breach of contract. In the former, the wrongdoer is liable for any
consequences which he might reasonably have anticipated, whereas in the latter,
foresight is no criterion, and the defaulting party is liable only for the direct
results of his breach, which were within the contemplation of the parties when
5
Under the ruling in the principal case the plainthe contract was made
just what profits he would have received had his injury
to
show
is
permitted
tiff
not intervened. While this appears to be correct as a ruling on admissibility of
evidence, it would seem to contravene two recent decisions, in which it was held
that the rule, in order to be correctly applied, should exclude all evidence of
profits from business, and admit only evidence as to the extent of the business,
the part the plaintiff played therein, and the usual compensation to persons doing
a similar business for another' Although the plaintiff in the principal case may
not be able to distinguish, in showing his profits lost, between the amount due to
his own efforts and that due to capital, and the labor of others, the ruling nevertheless seems to be within the purview of the cardinal principle underlying any
7
award for damages-fair compensation commensurate with the injury.
'Goodhart v. P. R. M, 177 Pa. 1, 35 At. i91 (i896) ; Silsby v. Mich. Car
Co., 95 Mich. 204, 54 N. W. 761 (1893) ; Jordan v. Ry., 124 Ia. i8o, 99 N. W.
693 (i9o4); Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Scheinkoenig, 6I Pac. 414 (Kan. 1900);
i SEDnwicic, DAMAGES (gth ed. 1912) § i8i; Note, (1900) 52 L. R. A. 33, 37.
2
Wallace v. P. R. R., i95 Pa. 127, 45 At. 685, 52 L. R. A. 33 (1900);
Hopkins v. Chicago City R. Co, i98 Ill. App. 656 (917) ; Heer v. Paving Co.,
ii8 Wis. 57, 94 N. W. 789 (9o3) ; Jordan v. Ry., supra note I; N. J. Express
Co. v. Nichols, 33 N. J. L. 434 (1869) ; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Posten, 59 Kan.
449, 53 Pac. 465 (1898) ; Kronold v. City of New York, 186 N. Y. 4o, 78 N. E.
572 (i9o6) ; contra: Chicago City Ry. v. Flynn, 131 Ill. App. 502 (9O7) ; York
v. City of Everton, 121 Mo. App. 640, 97 S. W. 604 (9o7).
'Weir v. Union Ry., i88 N. Y. 416, 8I N. E. i68 (igo7) ; Kirk v. Electric
Co., 58 Wash. 283, io8 Pac. 6o4 (igio).
' Johnson v. Manhattan P. Co., 4 N. Y. Supp. 848 (I889) ; Goodhart v.
P. R. R., supra note I.
5
For a discussion of this point and a collection of cases, see i SUTHERLAND,
DAMAGES (4th ed. 1916) 170 ff.
'Loschiavo v. Traction Co., io6 Ohio St. 6i, 138 N. E. 372, 27 A. L. M. 424
(1922), containing an able summary of the conflicting authorities, and a de novo
adjudication of this point for Ohio; Baxter v. P. & R. Ry., 264 Pa. 467, io7 Atl.
88i, 9 A. L. R. 504, 512 (i919). For further annotations, see 8 R. C. L.415, 472;
52 L. R. A. 33.
7 i SUTHERLAND, op. cit. supra note 5, § 12.
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EVIDENCE-ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE-WHAT CONSTITUTES UNLAWFUL SEIZURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULE-New York state troopers stopped

defendant's automobile on the highway for the purpose of notifying him to
adjust a headlight which, according to their testimony, was defective under state
law. The troopers opened the door of the auto, found and seized liquor, and
arrested defendant for transporting it. Defendant was indicted under the
National ProhibitionAct. No arrest for violation of state law was ever made.
Held, that the testimony tending to prove the finding of the liquor was admissible because the evidence was obtained by state officers incidentally to performance of their duty to enforce state laws. U. S. v. Jankowski, 28 F. (2d) 8oo
(C. C. A. 2d, 1928).

The so-called federal rule, which has crystallized only within recent years,
denies admissibility in criminal cases to evidence acquired illegally by the government or its agents,2 because a contrary rule would be violative of the constitutional guaranties against unreasonable searches and seizures and self-incrimination.' A similar rule obtains in about one-third of the states. The remaining
states allow the admission of such evidence on the theory that the circumstances
surrounding its acquisition do not affect its probative value and that the civil
action available to the wronged party is sufficient protection' The federal rule
has been limited in a number of respects, one of them being that unlawful
seizures operate to render evidence inadmissible only if made by federal officers,
the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution having no application
to the laws of the states or proceedings thereunder.5 It is broadly held that evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure by private persons' or by state
officers 7 is not inadmissible when offered by the United States. Conversely,
evidence unlawfully obtained by federal officers is admissible in state courts
abiding by the federal rule! The law is somewhat unsatisfactory as to the
141 STAT. 3o8 (1919),

27

U. S. C. A.

(1927)

12.

'Boyd v. U. S., 116 U. S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524 (1886) ; Weeks v. U. S., 232
U. S 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 34 (1914) ; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. U. S., 251 U. S.
385, 40 Sup. Ct. 182 (192o) ; Ganci v. U. S., 287 Fed. 6o (C. C. A. 2d, 1923) ;
Dumas v. State, 197 Ind. 123, 15o N. E. 24 (1925); Wigmore, Using Evidence

Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure (1922) 8 A. B. A. JOURNAL 479; Note
(1927) 36 YALE L. J. 536.
'Amendments IV and V, U. S. Constitution. State constitutions have
similar provisions.
' Shields v. State, lO4 Ala. 35, 16 So. 85 (1894) ; People v. Mayen, 188 Cal.
237, 205 Pac. 435 (1922); Calhoun v. State, I7 Ga. App. 705, 88 S. E. 586
(1916) ; Com. v. Wilkins, 243 Mass. 356, 138 N. E. II (1923) ; People v. Defore,
N. Y. 13, 15o N. E. 585 (1926) ; Com. v. Dabbierio, 290 Pa. 174, 138 Atl.

242

679 (1927) ; Note (1928) 52 A. L. R. 477.
'Crawford v. U. S., 5 F. (2d) 672 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925).
'Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 41 Sup. Ct. 574 (ig2i) ; Pedersen
v. U. S., 271 Fed. 187 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921) (seizure by British authorities). But
an individual who accompanies police officers at their request when they make an
unlawful seizure cannot testify. Copley v. Com., 219 Ky. 498, 293 S. W. 981
(1927).

'Weeks v. U. S., supra note 2; Rowan v. U. S., 281 Fed. 137 (C. C. A. 5th,
Gordon v. U. S., 18 F. (2d) 531 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927).
'State v. Gardner, 77 Mont. 8, 249 Pac. 574 (1926). Contra: State v.

1922);

Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254 Pac. 788 (1927).
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result of cases where there has been some collaboration between state and federal
agents. The evidence is clearly inadmissible if the state officers conducted the
The mere
search as the agents of federal officers and under their direction
presence and assistance of a federal officer at a search by state officers seems
not to render the evidence inadmissible.- If the state officer makes an unlawful
search and seizure solely on behalf of the United States for the purpose of aiding in the enforcement of the federal law under which an indictment is later
brought, the evidence is inadmissible though there was no direction by federal
authorities at the time of the seizure, the indictment being a ratification of the
unauthorized acts.' A search and seizure by any officer which is incidental to
a lawful arrest for any crime or misdemeanor has always been held justifiable.2
In the Jankowski case there was no arrest for violation of state law nor had
there been such violation in fact, yet the court holds the seizure of the liquor
incidental to the stopping of the auto for defective headlights. The dissenting
judge maintains that in substance the state officers were acting in behalf of the
United States, which if true would render their seizure unlawful, as shown
The quite evident effort
supra. The point appears to be one of some novelty.
of the court to find the seizure incidental in spite of strongly conflicting testimony indicates the present day struggle of many courts abiding by the federal
rule to limit its operation in prohibition enforcement cases.
LACHES-LACK OF KNOWLEDGE AND FAMiLY RELATIONSHIP-NO LACHES
ALTHOUGH TWENTY-THREE YEAR DELAY-Gatz, in June, 1902, by deed conveyed
his entire property, a farm then worth about $2ooo, to his only daughter, subject

to a life estate in his Wife. The deed was recorded in August, i9o2. When the
deed was made, Gatz, his wife, daughter, and two sons were all living on the
farm, and after his death in 192 the survivors continued to live there together
until the marriage of the daughter in 1913, after which the mother and sons
only resided thereon, the sons working the farm. In 1925 the daughter sued to
have her mother adjudged incompetent, when the sons claimed they first learned
of the deed, although having knowledge at all times since 19o2 of the mother's
"Flagg v. U. S., 233 Fed. 481 (C. C. A. 2d, x916) ; Re Schuetze, 299 Fed.
827 (W. D. N. Y. 1924) ; U. S. v. Costanzo, 13 F. (2d) 259 (W. D. N. Y. 1926).
11Thomas v. U. S., 290 Fed. 133 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923) ; Malacrauis v. U. S.,
299 Fed. 253 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1924); Brown v. U. S., 12 F. (2d) 926 (C. C. A.
gth, 1926). Contra: U. S. v. Case, 286 Fed. 627 (S. Dak. 1923); Byars v.

U. S., 273 U. S. 28, 47 Sup. Ct. 248 (1927) (joint search).
I Gambino v. U. S., 275 U. S. 310, 48 Sup. 137 (1927).

This case, like the
principal case, arose in New York, which has no prohibition enforcement act.
'Carroll v. U. S., 267 U. S. 132, 158, 45 Sup. Ct. 28o, 287 (1925) ; Agnello
v. U. S., 269 U. S. 20, 30, 46 Sup. Ct. 4, 5 (1925); Note (1926) 35 YALE
L. 3. 612.
"In Hernie v. U. S., 276 Fed. 8o6 (C. C. A. 9th, 1921), there was a seizure

by local police incidental to an investigation of a breach of the peace which in
fact was being committed. There was no reason to believe that the entry was a
mere pretext for searching for liquor and it was held no unlawful seizure. In
Dozier v. State, lO7 Ga. 708, 33 S. E. 418 (1899), the search was made while
defendant was under arrest for another offense; the question whether the search
was lawful did not arise, Georgia having adopted the rule that the evidence is
admissible nevertheless.
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claim of a life estate. The sons then sued to have the deed set aside on the
ground that Gatz was mentally incompetent and satisfactorily proved that contention. The farm had increased in value to at least $ioo,ooo, and the principal
defense was laches. Held, below, that the deed must be set aside; on appeal,
affirmed by operation of law, the court being evenly divided. Gatz v. Bain, 222
N. W. 131 (Mich. 1928).
Laches in an equitable defense, the allowance of which is a question for the
determination of the court upon the facts of each case in which it is set up.3
Mere lapse of time, although an important factor, is not controlling,' nor are
the courts bound by the provisions of statutes of limitations in upholding the
defense,' which is allowable even though the statutory period has not expired.'
There must as a rule be not only delay upon the one side, but change in circumstances with resultant injury upon the other unless the defense is allowed.
Thus great increase of value of the property is frequently held to be enough to
make it inequitable to refuse to allow the defense.' Laches will not, however,
be imputed to one in ignorance of his rights who acts promptly after he learns
of them,' nor to the government.8 So also one who was under a disability, as
infancy,' insanity, 0 or (at common law) coverture,5 is not imputable with laches,
but action must be brought within a reasonable time after the disability is re&
moved.
' Likewise the pendency of another action upon the same subject matter,' fraud,' and in some cases mistake,' will prevent laches, and when there is

'Hammond v. Hopkins, 143 U. S. 224, 12 Sup. Ct 418 (1891) ; Harwood v.
R. R. Co., 84 U. S. 78 (1872) ; Reynolds v. Sumner, 126 Il1. 58 (1888).
'Stewart v. Finkelstone, 2o6 Mass. 28, 92 N. E. 37, 28 L. R. A. (N. s.) 634
(igio) (summarizes bases for laches) ; Selden's Ex'r v. Kennedy, 104 Va. 826
(I9O6) ; see Galliher v. Cadwell, 145 U. S. 368, 12 Sup. Ct. 873 (1892); cf.
Sheldon v. Rockwell, 9 Wis. 166 (1859).
' Patterson v. Hewitt, 195 U. S. 309, 25 Sup. Ct. 35 (I9O4) ; Neppach v.
Jones, 20 Ore. 491, 26 Pac. 569 (189I).
'Alsop v. Riker, 155 U. S. 448, I5 Sup. Ct. 162 (894); Hammond v.
Wallace, 85 Cal. 522 (189o); Calhoun v. Millard, 121 N. Y. 69, 8 L. R. A. 248
(189o).
' Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Austin, 168 U. S. 685, 18 Sup. Ct. 223
(1898) ; Stewart v. Finkelstone, supra note 2.
8 Galliher v. Cadwell, supra note 2.
"Mall v. Otterson, 52 N. J. Eq. 522, 28 Atl. 9o7 (1894) ; Wilson v. Sullivan,
173 Pa. 253, 34 Atl. 23 (1896) ; Moorman v. Arthur, go Va. 455, i8 S. E. 869
(1894).

'San-Pedro etc. Co. v. U. S.. 146 U. S. 120, 13 Sup. Ct. 94 (1892); Commonwealth v. Erie and North East R. R. Co., 27 Pa. 339 (1856).
'Gibson v. Herriott, 55 Ark. 85, 17 S. W. 589 (I8g i ) ; Long v. Mulford,
17 Ohio St. 485 (1867).
" Highberger v. Stiffier, 21 Md. 338 (1863).
' Gibson v. Herriott, supra note 9, (discussing common law situation);
contra, Waldron v. Harvey, 54 W. Va. 6o8, 43 S. E. 6o3 (19o4) (under modern
law).
'Norris v. Hagen, 136 U. S. 386, IO Sup. Ct. 942 (1889) ; Ralston v. Lahee,
8 Iowa 17 (1859).
"Russell v. Dayton Coal Co., 1O9 Tenn. 43, 70 S. W. I (1902).
" Michaud, et al. v. Girod, et al., 45 U. S. 503 (1846).
' Gould v. Emerson, 16o Mass. 438 (1893).
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an intimate or confidential relationship between the parties,' especially a family
relationship,' laches is not as a rule imputed. Thus the result in the instant case
is proper, laches being, it would seem, so much a matter within the discretion of
the trial court as not to be disturbed on appeal unless clearly wrong."
MINES AND MINING-RIGHT TO SUBJACENT SuPPoRT-The

defendant, who

was the owner of mineral rights beneath the plaintiff's land, leased the mine to a
third party. The lease provided that the lessee might remove pillars of coal left
standing from the lessor's previous mining operations; and that the lessee would
indemnify the defendant against any claims for damages made by surface owners. The lessee removed the pillars, and as a result, the plaintiff's land subsided.
Held, the plaintiff could recover from the defendant lessor. Republic Iron &
Steel Co. v. Barter,II8 So. 74g (Ala. 1928).
When two separate estates exist in land, one a surface estate, and the other
a mineral estate, the owner of the surface estate is the dominant tenant, and is
entitled to subjacent support from the owner of the mineral estate1 This right
has sometimes been termed an easement appurtenant to the surface estate, but
is more frequently, and perhaps more correctly, regarded as an absolute proprietary right vesting in the surface owner.' Failure in the duty to render support
for the surface estate makes the owner of the mineral estate liable, whether or
not the removal of the minerals has been done in a negligent manner.' The courts
have adopted two theories as the basis of recovery by the surface owner. Some
courts hold that when the mineral estate is granted, there is an implied reservation in the grant that only sufficient minerals may be taken away as will leave
adequate support for the surface.' This presumptive, or implied, reservation
may be waived by express provirion, and there is in such a case, no resultant
"Townsend v. Vanderwerker, i6o U. S. 17r, i6 Sup. Ct. 258 (1895) (foster
child) ; Elmore v. Jackson, 143 Ill. 513 (1892) (attorney and client) ; Douglass
v. Ferris, 138 N. Y. 192 (1893) (guardian and ward).
"Jameson v. Rixey, 94 Va. 342, 26 S. E. 861 (897) (sisters) ; Fawcett v.
Fawcett, 85 Wis. 332, 55 N. W. 405 (1893) (husband and wife).
"Leathers v. Stewart, io8 Me. 96, 79 Atl. i6 (I91).
IHarris v. Ryding, 5 M. & W. 6o (z839) ; Humphries v. Brogden, 12 Q. B.
739 (185o); Wilms v. Jess, 94 Ill. 464 (1880); WHITE, MINES AND MINING
REMEDIES (1903) § 139; (i920) 68 U. OF PA. L. REV. 399. 66
'Robertson v. Youghiogheny River Coal Co., 172 Pa. 5 , 33 Adt. 7o6 (I896).
'Youghiogheny River Coal Co. v. Allegheny Nat. Bank, 211 Pa. 319, 6o Atl.
924 (1905) ; West Pratt Coal Co. v. Dorman, i6i Ala. 389, 49 So. 849 (i9o9);
Collins v. Gleason Coal Co., 140 Iowa 114, ii5 N. W. 497 (i9o8).
'Harris v. Ryding; Humphries v. Brogden, both supra note I; Berkey v.
Berwind-White Coal Co., 229 Pa. 417, 78 Adt. ioo4 (1911).
'Harris v. Ryding, supra note I; Campbell v. Louisville Coal Mining Co.,
39 Colo. 379, 89 Pac. 767 (i9o7); Coleman v. Chadwick, 8o Pa. 81 (1875).
This theory was carried to its logical conclusion in the case of Noonan v. Pardee,
200 Pa. 474, 5o Atl. 255 (i9o), when Dean, J., announced: "What the surface
owner has a right to demand is sufficient support, even if to that end it be necessary to leave every pound of coal untouched under his land." Cf. Griffin v.
Fairmount Coal Co., 59 W. Va. 48o, 53 S. E. 24 (1905).
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liability on the mineral owner for subsidence of the surface. Other courts base
a recovery by the surface owner on the principle found in the maxim sic utero
tuo ut alienum non laedes-translatedliberally, thus use your own property that
you do not injure the property of others? Whatever the theory adopted, there
is practically universal authority for holding the owner of the mineral estate
liable8 However, where the owner of the mineral estate has leased to another,
the duty to render subjacent support devolves upon the lessee, and he is liable
for injury to the surface.9 But where the owner of the mineral estate has leased
the rights to operate the mine to another, and has expressly authorized the removal of minerals, and the performance of the authorized acts results in the
injury, the lessor,as well as the lessee, is held liable." In such a case, the absolute duty to provide surface support rests in the lessor, and he cannot by authorization of a third party to conduct the mining operations divest himself of his
duty or liability, whether the other party be merely a servant, or whether he be
an independent contractor.' The mere fact that the lessor has required an indemnity from the lessee against claims of surface owners obviously does not
affect his liability.
PATENTS-PRocEss PATENTs-NoTICE OF INFRINGEMENT AS PREREQUISITE
TO REcovERY OF DAMAGs-Section 4900 of the Revised Statutes' requires that

"any patentee," in order to recover damages for infringement of his patent, must
6

WHITE, loc. cit. supra note I.

7

In Griffin v. Fairmount Coal Co., supra note 5,there will be found in the
concurring opinion of Cox, J., an exhaustive discussion of the two theories upon
which recovery of the surface owner is based. In that case, the court, though
apparently willing to recognize the principle embodied in the maxim sic utere
tuo ut alienum non laedes, refused to permit a recovery by a surface owner who
had leased all the coal beneath his land, on the ground that by such a lease the
surface owner impliedly waived his right to surface support.
'Williams v. Gibson, 84 Ala. 228, 4 So. 350 (1887); Carlin v. Chappel, ioi
Pa. 348 (1882) ; Williams v. Hay, 120 Pa. 485, 114 Atl. 379 (1888).
9
Offerman v. Starr, 2 Pa. 394 (1845). The theory upon which the owner
of real estate, whether it be a surface or a mineral estate, is relieved of liability
for injuries to another when committed by a lessee is analogous to the independent contractor doctrine of agency. This view is expressed by Shaw, J., in Earle
v. Hall, 43 Mass. 353, 359 (1841) : ".

.

.

it is manifest that we are not merely

to inquire who is the general owner of the estate, in ascertaining who is responsible for acts done upon it injurious to another, but who has the efficient control;
for whose account, at whose expense, under whose orders, is the business carried on,
the conduct of which has occasioned the injury."
10 Siddons v. Short, 2 C. P. D. 572 (1877); Kistler v. Thompson, 158 Pa.
139, 27 At. 874 (1893) ; Campbell v. Louisville Coal Mining Co., supra note 5;
MACSWINNEY, MINES (5th ed. 1922) § 967.
'Tarry v. Ashton, I Q. B. D. 314 (1876) ; Riley v. Simpson, 83 Cal. 217,
23 Pac. 293 (189o) ; Cabot v. Kingman, 166 Mass. 403, 44 N. E. 344 (0896).
In Dalton v. Angus, 6 App. Cas. 740 (1881) at 829, Lord Blackburn states the
law as follows: ".

. . a person causing something to be done, the doing of

which casts on him a duty, cannot escape from responsibility attaching to him
by delegating the duty to a contractor. He may bargain with the contractor
that he shall perform the duty and stipulate for an indemnity from him . . .
but he cannot relieve himself from liability."
I U. S. Coitp. STAT. (1916) 9446.

RECENT CASES
have marked on the article the word "Patented" or, having failed to do so, must
show that he has "duly notified" the defendant of the infringement. A New
Jersey company sued to recover damages for the infringement of a manufacturing process, no notice having been given to the defendant of the infringement.
Held, that a process patent is not within Section 49o0, and damages may be
recovered without showing notice to the infringer. Wagner v. Corn Products
Refining Co., 28 F. (2d) 617 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928).
Although the requirements embraced in Section 4900 have been in force for
more than fifty years, the principal case is the first one in which an appellate
court has expressed its opinion as to whether those requirements apply to a
process patent or are limited to patent articles. Indeed there appear to be only
two prior cases in which this precise question has been presented to any court.'
The same court decided both cases, holding in each one that a process patent is
not within Section 4900. Although the court in the principal case is largely
influenced by them, it is to be noted that these two decisions have been authoritatively criticized as being based entirely upon a misinterpretation of a previous
case dealing with patent articles.' In addition to these authorities to support its
judgment, the court in the principal case points to the fact that it is impossible
to mark a process, and concludes therefrom that the legislature could not have
intended to include such a patent within Section 4900. But in construing this
section courts have not considered the element of marking as of primary importance. The element which has been stressed is notice, in one form or another.
It has been regularly held that marking "patented" on an article constitutes constructive notice to all infringers, but that in the absence of such marking, actual
notice to the individual infringer must be given,' and damages may be recovered
- They
3

were originally contained in the AcT OF JULY 8, 1870, 38, 16 STAT. 198.
U. S. Mitis Co. v. Carnegie Steel Co., 89 Fed. 206 (C. C. W. D. Pa. 1898) ;
U. S. Mitis Co. v. Midvale Steel Co., 135 Fed. 103 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1904). Two
other cases deserve mention: International Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Co., 262 Fed.
438 (D. C. E. D. Pa. i919), in which the court said by way of dictum at 441,
that the statute applied as well to process patents as to patent articles; and
Parker Rust Proof Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 23 F. (2d) 502 (D. C. E. D. Mich.
1928) where two of the four patents involved were process patents, and the
court held that actual notice was required. Apparently, however, no distinction
between the two types of patents was brought to the court's attention.
'Curtis, The Markizg of Patented Articles (1921) 21 COL. L. REV. 305. The
case to which Prof. Curtis referred as being subsequently misconstrued was
Dunlap v. Schofield, 152 U. S. 244 (1894), in which the court said, "The clear
meaning of the section (§ 4900) is that the patentee or his assignee, if he makes
or sells the article patented, cannot recover damages against infringers of the
patent unless he has given notice." Prof. Curtis says at p. 210: "The fallacy
of the cases taking this view (i. e. that marking or notice is not required in the
case of patents for processes) consists in making the inference from the language of the court in Dunlap v. Schofield that if the owner of the patent does
not make and sell the article patented, he is not obliged to give notice at all."
' Gibson v. American Graphophone Co., 234 Fed. 633 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916);
Franklin Co. v. Shapiro, 278 Fed. 435 (C. C. A. 3d, 1921) ; Robinson v. Jeffrey
Co., io F. (2d) 384 (D. C. W. D. Pa. 1926); Muther v. Shoe Machinery Co.,
21 F. (2d) 773 (D. C. Mass. 1927) ; Parker Rust Proof Co. v. Ford Motor Co.,
supra note 2; Curtis, op. cit. supra note 4.
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only if the defendant has persisted in his infringements after such notice.' In
the case of a patent article, impossibility of marking has been held not to excuse
the failure to give notice; the plaintiff patentee, in such a situation, must rely
upon individual notice to the infringer.7 It seems that a process patentee should
be held to the same requirement, and not be enabled to plead impossibility of
marking in order to remove himself from Section 49oo. It is not reasonable to
suppose that the legislature intended to protect innocent infringers of patent
articles and not to afford the same protection to such infringers of patent processes. It is doubtful whether the Supreme Court would adopt such an interpretation of Section 4900.

SALES-RIGHTS OF HOLDER OF BILL OF LADING WHEN
SUBSEQUENT TO ITS

ISSUANCE-A

GooDS

contracted to sell cotton to B.

DEIVERED

Before the

cotton was delivered, B obtained negotiable bills of lading for it from a steamship company, and negotiated them to banks which acted in good faith and gave
value. When B received the cotton from A, he delivered it to the steamship
company. Later, on discovering B's insolvency, A rescinded the contract and
sued in replevin for the cotton, alleging that B secured the cotton through fraud.
Held, that A cannot recover the cotton because the banks had title as bona fide
purchasers for value before the attempted rescission. Baldwin v. Childs, 63
N. E. 737 (N. Y. 1928).

When a bill of lading is issued by a carrier before the goods are received,
the bill does not represent any goods and a transfer of it will not pass title to
anything.' The effect of a subsequent delivery of the goods is to give title to the
person holding the bill of lading.2 There are two theories by which title passes
at this time: one by "estoppel," ' and the other by "appropriation" of goods to
fulfill the contract.' The theory of "feeding the estoppel" is open to two objections: the first is that when the goods are not specific at the time the bill of
lading was secured, it cannot be said that it was those particular goods which
the bill of lading originally specified;' the second is that when the goods are not
'Cases supra note 5 and Dunlap v. Schofield, supra note 4; American Caramel Co. v. Mills & Bro., 162 Fed. 147 (C. C. A. 3d, 1907); Westinghouse Electric Co. v. Condit Electrical Co., 159 Fed. 154 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 19o8); Flat
Slab Patents Co. v. Turner, 285 Fed. 257 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922) ; Curtis, op. cit.
supra note 4.
'Flat Slab Patents Co. v. Turner, supra note 6. Damages were awarded
only for infringements subsequent to notice, as in cases cited supra note 6.
'Atchison, Top. & S. Fe R. R. Co. v. Harold, 241 U.
665 (I916); Pollard v. Vinton, 105 U. S. 7 (i88i); Bank
York, Lake Erie & Western R. R. Co., io6 N. Y. 195, 12 N.
2 Pyle v. Texas Transport & Terminal Co., 238 U. S.

S. 371, 36 Sup. Ct.
of Batavia v. New
E. 433 (1887).
90, 35 Sup. Ct. 677

(1914) ; Lovell v. Newman, 192 Fed. 753 (C. C. A. 5th, 1912) ; Hentz v. Lovell,
192 Fed. 762 (C. C. A. 5th, 1912) ; The Idaho, 93 U. S. 575 (1876) ; Halliday v.
Hamilton, II Wall. 56o (U. S. 187o) ; Rowley v. Bigelow, 29 Mass. 3o6 (1832).

'The Idaho; Halliday v. Hamilton; Rowley v. Bigelow, all supra note 2.
'Lovell v. Newman; Hentz v. Lovell, all supra note 2.
'See Bryans v. Mix, 4 M. & W. 775 (1839) for discussion by Baron Parke.

RECENT CASES
received to fulfill the prior bill of lading the holder of it is not entitled to them,6
a fact which would not be important if there were an estoppel. As the title to
personal property can pass by an intention to pass it manifested by an overt act,'
the theory of "appropriation" seems preferable! Regardless of which theory
the courts have adopted, in the few cases raising the point it has been held that
the seller cannot retake the goods ;9 the goods cannot be attached as the property
of the seller ;'0 and the trustee in bankruptcy of the seller has no claim to the
goods. Thus it seems that title passes for all purposes, and so in the principal
case it is not surprising to find that the passage of title to a bona fide purchaser
for value prevents a former owner from rescinding a sale under a voidable
contract.

Toavs-PRoxImATE CAUsE-The Penal Law of New York forbids the
sale of air rifles to children under 16 years of age. The defendant sold an
air rifle to R, a boy of 13. R's mother, to prevent his using the rifle, took
it from him and hid it. Six months later, R found it and while engaged in
playing with it with another boy, the latter shot it and injured the plaintiff. Held, the defendant's act is the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury,
and he is liable. Henningsen v. Markowitz, 230 N. Y. Supp. 313 (1928).
Nothing in the law has been the subject of so much prolific attention by
writers as the problem of 'proximate cause,' and no other subject in the law
has given rise to a greater mass of contradictory decisions, counting for very
little as precedents, because each depends upon its particular state of facts. The
opinions always abound in sweeping generalities, which are, however, valueless
in formulating a definite rule to be applied by a trial judge in charging a
jury. However, a group of writers including Bohlen,' Edgerton,' Smith' and
'Jackson v. Hale, 14 How. 525 (U. S. 1852); 'Smith v. Missouri Pacific
R. R. Co., 74 Mo. App. 48 (1897).
I WILLISTON€, CONTRACrS (1924) §§ 348, 349.
82 WILLISTON, SAL.ES (i924) § 417. A possible objection is that an assent
to the appropriation on the part of the holder of the bill of lading must be presumed, because the only actual assent when he took the bill of lading was to a
present passage of title.
'The Idaho, supra note 2.
10Halliday v. Hamilton, supra note 2.
" Lovell v. Newman, supra note 2; cf. Pyle v. Texas Transport & Terminal
Co., supra note 2.
'Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law arnd Fact (1924) 72 U. OF PA. L. Rv.
III; Bohlen, The Probable arnd Natural Consequences as the Test of Liability
il Negligence (1901) 49 U. oF PA. L. REV. 79.
2Edgerton, Legal Cause (1924) 72 U. OF PA. L. REV. 211, 343. Professor
Edgerton suggests that the test of proximate cause should be whether or not
there is such a relation between the cause and the consequence that it is just
to hold the defendant liable.
'Smith, Legal Cause in Actims of Tort (1911-1912) 25 HARv. L. REv.
103, 223, 252.

The tenor of Smith's analysis is that proximate cause should

be reduced to the question of whether or not the defendant's conduct has been
a substantial element in causing the plaintiff's injury.
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Green,' has done much in the last few years to strip the subject of its bewildering aspects, and to lay it bare for what it actually is-a simple question
of fact, which holds no terrors if approached without formulas and withi
the application of common sense. Once it is established that the defendant
has violated a duty to the plaintiff,' and that his conduct is an actual cause
of the plaintiff's injury,' the question as to whether the defendant's conduct is
so materially a cause as to make him liable is a simple question of fact, no
more difficult or complicated than many other questions of fact submitted to
a jury with no other guide than a few generalities and their own common
sense. As is usually the case, the courts have been very reluctant to abandon
familiar ground, though its landmarks are very confusing, even though eminent writers have pointed out its confusions and offer for the taking a treatment of the subject that is not only logical, but is very easy of application.
Therefore, the principal case, in which the court refused to adopt any of
the old tests as to lapse of time and intervening factors, but treated the
case as presenting a simple question of fact for the court, is very significant,
and it is submitted, very commendable.
Green's view is that
'GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927).
causal relation is always a question of fact for the jury except when the facts
are such that they will suport only one reasonable inference.
American courts require a duty owed to the plaintiff which has been
breached by the defendant. Anthony v. Slade, 52 Mass. 290 (1846) ; Hoag v.
Lake Shore & Michigan Southern R. R. Co., 85 Pa. 293 (1877). English
courts do not require a breach of duty to the defendant. Smith v. London &
Southwestern Ry. Co., [i87o] L. R. 6 C. P. 14
'Before any question of proximate cause arises, it must first be determined
whether the defendant's conduct contributed to the plaintiff's injury at all.
Laidlaw v. Sage, i58 N. Y. 73, 52 N. E. 679 (1899); Baltimore & Ohio R. R.
Co. v. School District, 96 Pa. 65 (i88o); Stacy v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 84
Wis. 614, 54 N. W. i09I (1893).

